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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy has been a fertile ground for the economic analysis
of law. A significant portion of bankruptcy scholarship during the
past fifteen years applies the basic assumptions of standard economic
theory to the problems caused by financial distress. This scholarship
begins with the premise that people make choices in a rational man-
ner in order to maximize their individual utility. It applies this axiom
to questions ranging from when do individuals file for bankruptcy to
how bankruptcy laws affect firms' investment decisions. As it has in
most other areas of law (especially private law), law and economics
has both reshaped our understanding of extant bankruptcy law and
generated numerous proposals for reform.
As illustrated by this symposium, scholars studying the way
people make decisions have demonstrated that decision making
routinely departs from the ideal posited by standard economic analy-
sis. In various and systematic ways, people make choices which de-
part from the rational actor model that is the basis of much economic
analysis of law. They dislike losses more than they like gains of the
same amount, prefer the status quo, do not update beliefs in a ra-
tional manner, and otherwise fail to fit the model of Homo economus.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Rebecca Brown, Don Langevoort,




These insights could be used to enrich the study of bankruptcy
law in various ways. One such way would be to examine the workings
of current law. For example, the extant reorganization process of
Chapter 11 is predicated on bargaining among the affected parties,
and the literature on behavioral economics suggests that people at
times bargain in ways that are more "fair" than they are rational.'
Similarly, Congress is currently considering major reform to bank-
ruptcy law as it applies to individuals, based largely on a perception
that some individuals use these laws opportunistically. In this Essay,
however, I begin the project of re-examining the strand of bankruptcy
scholarship that attempts to specify optimal bankruptcy rules for
firms in financial distress.
This Essay first identifies the ways in which the normative
prescriptions of the economic analysis of bankruptcy law rely on as-
sumptions of individual rationality, and then examines one of these
assumptions-namely, the assumption that creditors pass on the cost
of an inefficient bankruptcy regime to the debtors to whom they ex-
tend credit. This is not to say that the other ways in which the eco-
nomic analysis of bankruptcy law is driven by the rational actor
model are uninteresting or unimportant. Rather, I only hope to show
that behavioral economics can enrich the economic analysis of bank-
ruptcy law.
II. THE RATIONAL ACTOR IN BANKRUPTCY THEORY
Thomas Jackson and Douglas Baird articulated the first law
and economics model of corporate bankruptcy law.2 They argued that
bankruptcy law responds to a common pool problem that individual
creditors would face under state debt collection law.3 Outside of bank-
ruptcy, general unsecured creditors of a debtor are in a race amongst
themselves for the debtor's unencumbered assets. Each creditor will
1. See Richard H. Thaler, The Ultimatum Game, in THE WNNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES
AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIE 264, 278-79 (1992); Werner Guth et al., An Experimental
Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 367, 384 (1982).
2. Economists had earlier used the rational actor in the bankruptcy context. The focus of
the economists, however, was quite different from that of Baird and Jackson. The economists
were concerned about when firms file for bankruptcy, whereas Baird and Jackson used the
rational actor model to explain the contours of bankruptcy law itself.
3. Baird and Jackson set forth their theory in a series of articles, some written
individually, some co-authored. These articles culminated in THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). The general contours of their theory can be found in the




be paid only when it can induce the debtor to voluntarily pay, or when
it litigates its claim to judgment, and thus can call on the aid of the
state in obtaining the debtor's assets. This system works well when a
firm has sufficient assets to pay off all of its creditors. Creditors are
able to watch after their own interests, and take appropriate action to
ensure that they are paid. Debtors, on the other hand, have various
incentives to voluntarily pay all legitimate claims. Debtors who do
not pay legitimate debts face not only the threat of lawsuits, but also
the possibility that they will not be able to find credit in the future.
Problems arise, however, when the firm's debts exceed its
assets. In this situation, Baird and Jackson argued that unsecured
creditors face a common pool problem., There are simply not enough
assets to pay all creditors in full. The general nonbankruptcy rule is
that creditors have no legal obligation to other creditors. Creditors
who are paid keep the funds that they receive. Creditors who are not
paid can only look to their debtor, and when the debtor has paid out
all of its assets, the unpaid creditors have nowhere to turn. In this
situation, each creditor recognizes that if it is the first to collect on its
debt, it will be paid in full, whereas slower creditors will receive
nothing. Traditional law and economics, however, generally does not
worry about differences in distribution. Rather, it is concerned with
maximizing overall welfare.4 The welfare loss that Baird and Jackson
identified in this situation was that unsecured creditors in a first-
come, first-served debt-collection system would engage in actions that
lessened the overall value of the firm. Most obviously, each unsecured
creditor has an incentive to seize sufficient assets to pay off its debt.
Repeated seizures of assets could lead to suboptimal deployment of
the debtor's assets. Each creditor is concerned only with being paid in
full; it has no rational interest in ensuring that the debtor's assets
remain in their most-valued configuration. Most dramatically, pur-
suit of individual remedies could lead to piecemeal liquidation of the
firm. While unsecured creditors as a group would benefit from the
optimal deployment of the firm's assets, the incentives of each
individual unsecured creditor run counter to the group interest.
Baird and Jackson argued that this common pool problem
creates other costs beyond suboptimal deployment of the firm's assets.
First, since each rational creditor can anticipate that there will be a
race to the debtor's assets once the firm becomes insolvent, each
4. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &




creditor has an incentive to monitor the affairs of the debtor. To the
extent that much of this monitoring is repetitive, this represents an
excess cost. Second, once the race to the assets begins, each creditor
will spend money to collect on its debt. These multiple expenditures
are again a cost that, all things being equal, should be avoided.
Moreover, to the extent that the debtor has to defend itself in multiple
forums against these various collection efforts, the cost of these mul-
tiple defenses will also reduce the total amount available to creditors
as a group.
According to Baird and Jackson, bankruptcy law is the answer
to this common-pool problem. They posit that if the unsecured credi-
tors could negotiate amongst themselves, they would agree to forego
their individual debt collection remedies, and instead opt for a
collective system. This system would require all creditors to
participate in a single forum. In that forum, the unsecured creditors,
who are the residual claimants of an insolvent firm, would decide on
the optimal deployment of the debtor's assets. Bankruptcy law had to
be mandated by the government because creditors could never reach
an actual agreement among themselves. Baird and Jackson therefore
characterized bankruptcy law as a hypothetical agreement among
creditors, and called their view the "creditors' bargain" model of
bankruptcy.
Behavioral economics has little to add to this account of bank-
ruptcy law. The "bargain" that the creditors reach is a purely hypo-
thetical one. There is no actual meeting and no actual negotiation
between parties. Rather, it is the "agreement" that creditors would
reach if they were fully informed and fully rational. In other words, it
is the efficient result, not the result of any actual consent.5 The only
prediction of human behavior on which this view of bankruptcy law
relies is that, absent a mandatory collective regime, creditors would
engage in a destructive race to the assets. To be sure, some of the
results from behavioral economics suggest that contrary to the as-
sumptions of traditional microeconomics, people may not be willing to
pursue their own ends relentlessly at the expense of others.6 This
may suggest that not all creditors, when they perceive that a limited
fund exists, would immediately rush to collect at the expense of
5. On the importance of distinguishing between actual consent and hypothetical consent,
see Ronald M. Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 573-79 (1980) (noting that
actual consent carries the imprimatur of individual autonomy, but hypothetical consent carries
no such normative implication).




everyone else. Yet this hardly suggests that all creditors would vol-
untarily forego their collection remedies. 7 Indeed, once it becomes
apparent that some creditors would not voluntarily forego their collec-
tion efforts other creditors who might otherwise be willing to restrain
their efforts, may feel compelled to join in the race to the debtor's
assets. Thus, nothing in behavioral economics calls for a re-examina-
tion of the Baird and Jackson model of bankruptcy law.
The creditors' bargain model, however, is no longer the only
economic account of bankruptcy law. Law and economics scholars
following Baird and Jackson have attacked the creditors' bargain
explanation of bankruptcy law not because of its use of the rational
actor model, but rather because of its failure to apply the model fully.
Baird and Jackson treated creditors as rational actors; debtors, how-
ever, can also be treated as rational actors. When debtors are so
conceived, the Baird and Jackson justification for a governmentally
imposed bankruptcy law evaporates. 8 Rational debtors have the in-
centive to borrow money and purchase goods at the lowest possible
cost. They force creditors to compete for the opportunity to supply
credit. To the extent that creditors are thus in a competitive market,
they will only receive the competitive rate of return on their loans.
This competitive market for credit implies, contrary to Baird and
Jackson, that it is the debtors, not the creditors, that are harmed by
inefficient debt collection law. To the extent that debt collection law
creates a common pool problem which decreases the value of a
debtor's assets and increases creditor costs, these costs will lower the
expected return that a creditor will receive from a financially dis-
tressed debtor. Because creditors are operating in a competitive
market, they have to be promised, on an ex ante basis, a competitive
rate of return. To ensure they receive such a return, they will pass
the costs of an inefficient debt collection law on to their debtors in the
form of higher interest rates. In other words, even if bankruptcy law
were in fact more efficient than state debt collection law, creditors
would not bargain for such a regime; creditors in a competitive
7. Cf. Robyn Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Cooperation, in THE WINER'S CURSE, supra
note 1, at 20 (describing situation in which farmers in Ithaca put fruit and a cashbox on a table;
while the farmers trust that most people will voluntarily put money in the cashbox in exchange
for the fruit, the cashbox is secured because the farmers fear that someone will take the box).
8. At least as a normative matter. The creditors' bargain model may still be used to
explain existing law. When it enacted the Bankruptcy Code, Congress was worried that state
law remedies, unchecked by federal law, would lead to a race to the courthouse that could lower
the value of the debtor's assets. Thus, to the extent that Congress perceived a common pool
problem existed, the Baird and Jackson model remains a powerful explanation of how
bankruptcy law should and does respond to this problem.
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market receive a competitive return regardless of the governing legal
regime. Rather, if bankruptcy law were more efficient, it would be
the regime that debtors would offer to their creditors in order to hold
down their cost of credit.9
The change in perspective from rational creditors to rational
creditors and rational debtors translates into a markedly different
normative prescription for federal bankruptcy law. When the focus
was on rational creditors alone, federal law was necessary to ensure
that the optimal bankruptcy regime was in place, because creditors
were never in a position to bargain or reach actual agreement among
themselves. Creditors are generally unaware of the identity of other
creditors of their common debtor, and, even if they had such knowl-
edge, creditors become creditors at different times, thereby precluding
negotiations among all creditors. Thus, any "agreement," even if
optimal, could not be reached privately but would have to be imposed
on creditors by the state.
The argument for mandatory bankruptcy law was also
supported by a strategic impediment: Each individual creditor would
have an incentive to opt out of bankruptcy's collective proceeding. If
all other creditors would agree to such a proceeding, the creditor who
did not agree to the collective proceeding would retain the freedom to
collect its debt in full. To prevent such opportunistic behavior, the
conclusion was that bankruptcy law had to be mandated by the gov-
ernment to ensure that all creditors were relegated to the single
bankruptcy forum.
Once debtors are treated as rational actors as well, however,
the case for a mandated bankruptcy law collapses. Debtors bear the
cost of any suboptimal debt-collection regime. Thus, they have the
incentive to offer their creditors an insolvency regime that maximizes
the debtor firm's value. Whereas practical constraints preclude
creditors from bargaining with each other, the debtor contracts with
each of its individual creditors.'0 It thus has the opportunity to select
9. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 M. L. REV. 51, 62 (1992) (discussing default rules and efficiency); Alan
Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1812 (1998)
(stating that parties could solve their problems at the credit extension stage if they were free to
do so).
10. This observation of course does not apply to nonconsensual creditors. All agree that
the state should continue the current practice of mandating the treatment that such creditors
receive. Most law and economics scholars argue, however, that the current treatment of such
creditors as unsecured creditors is inefficient, and that such creditors should be accorded more
favorable treatment than they currently receive. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and
Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 340 (1993) (arguing
that giving higher priority to nonconsensual claimants minimizes external risk); Lucian Arye
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a governing bankruptcy regime, which it can then offer to all of its
creditors. While there have been various proposals as to the mecha-
nism by which debtors could make this offer-charter provisions
selected from a menu of options,"' individual contracts selected from a
menu of options, 2 individual contracts created solely by private par-
ties's-the intellectual underpinning of all of these proposals is the
basic argument that underlies the economic case for freedom of con-
tract. This argument posits that the parties are in the best position to
reach an agreement that maximizes their joint welfare. In this con-
text, the argument is that both debtors and creditors are rational
actors who are fully able to judge the expected consequences of the
various options open to them. Creditors, through the market, are
limited to a competitive rate of return, and the debtor can offer the
option that maximizes its own utility.
Once the bankruptcy literature expanded to include rational
debtors, the scholarship broadened to encompass not only actions that
creditors will take when a debtor becomes insolvent, but also actions
that debtors will take prior to financial distress. Earlier work had
focused on two discrete sets of issues: the cost of running bank-
ruptcy's collective proceeding and the future deployment of the firm's
assets. Lower costs and optimal deployment were the goals of an
efficient bankruptcy regime. The new scholarship additionally looks
at the effects that bankruptcy law has on a firm's investment
decisions prior to the initiation of the applicable insolvency regime.
Debtors have a variety of ways in which they can invest the
firm's assets. They can continue with current operations, switch to
new lines of business, or shut down entirely and convert all assets to
cash. Debtors, of course, are run by managers. These managers, in
selecting which investments to pursue, will act in their own self-inter-
est. Thus managers will make investment decisions based on how
management will fare both when the decisions turn out to be
successes (and there is little role for bankruptcy in that state of the
world) and when they turn out to be failures. To the extent that
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
105 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (1996) (arguing that secured creditors should get only partial priority);
David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLtM. L. REV. 1565,
1643-49 (1991) (arguing that nonconsensual creditors should be classified differently than
general unsecured creditors).
11. See Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 100-07 (describing a menu of bankruptcy options that
balances the optimal rule for each type of firm and the associated costs).
12. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1850 (arguing that bankruptcy law should supply
parties with default rules that they may then contract around to create a system they prefer).
13. See Adler, supra note 10, at 323-24 (proposing a hypothetical contract arrangement).
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bankruptcy law shields managers from the consequences of
investment decisions which turn out poorly, managers will be more
inclined to pursue risky investments.
The most recent work in the economic analysis of business
bankruptcy attempts to specify the optimal bankruptcy regime-in
other words, which set of promises by the debtor ensures that the
firm's assets will be placed to their highest valued use after insol-
vency, minimizes the costs of making that decision, and creates incen-
tives for managers to invest in all projects with a positive net present
value while foregoing all projects with a negative net present value. 4
While the details of the competing arguments on this score range
beyond the scope of this Essay, it is important to emphasize that this
literature fully embraces the standard rational actor model of micro-
economics. It assumes that managers regard potential returns from
projects in an unbiased fashion, and that they select projects accord-
ing to which ones further their own interests. 5
In sum, the current economic account of bankruptcy law
invokes the traditional rational actor model in three different ways.
First, it assumes that creditors are rational actors lending in a com-
petitive market, and thus only receive a competitive rate of return. 6
Second, it assumes that the residual owners of the firm are rational in
that they perceive the cost of inefficient bankruptcy laws both in the
credit market and in the actions of the managers they hire to run the
firm. Finally, it assumes that managers act rationally in their self-
interest both when they make investment decisions and when they
decide to put the firm into bankruptcy.
14. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1826-27 (describing the contractual choices presented to
a firm and its creditors).
15. See Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Incentives, 62 U. Cm. L.
REV. 575, 576-77 (1995) (stating that gambles by managers often profit the managers rather
than the investors); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on
Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1166 (1994) (stating that managers are often
focused on prolonging their tenure); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy
and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STuD. 277, 279 (1991) (stating that managers' investment
choices are affected by how they are treated in bankruptcy); Alan Schwartz, The Absolute
Priority Rule and the Firm's Investment Policy, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213, 1216 (1994) (stating that
managers take less profitable projects if it will ensure their retention); Schwartz, supra note 9,
at 1821 (stating that managers will prefer the bankruptcy system that enables them to remain
in control longer).
16. This same assumption drives much of the economic analysis of secured credit. For
example, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 10, at 864-65 (stating that many creditors with small
claims are "rationally uninformed"); Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396, 1399 (1997) (assuming that all parties are risk-neutral).
[Vol. 51:16791686
PRICING OF CREDIT
Ill. INCORPORATING BEHAVIORAL EcoNOMIcs INTO CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY LAW
The normative claims of the economic analysis of corporate
bankruptcy law thus rest heavily on the assumption of individual
rationality. Behavioral economics, however, has documented numer-
ous examples of ways in which individuals systematically deviate
from the rational actor model. To name but a few, people tend to
exhibit a status quo bias,1 they tend to value fairness over pure self-
interest, 8 they tend to have a greater preference for avoiding losses
than for achieving an equal-sized gain,19 and they tend to overesti-
mate their own abilities.20 Few scholars continue to assert that the
rational actor model accurately captures reality.
The crucial question is what implications these systematic
departures from pure rationality should have for law and legal
reform. I doubt that one can make global statements regarding the
conclusions that flow from the insights of behavioral economics. Law
touches most, if not all, human activity. It may well be the case that
most or all of us exhibit to some extent the various tendencies
identified in the behavioral economics literature.21 But we make
different decisions in different settings. Some decisions occur in well-
organized markets, others do not. Some decisions occur in an
institutional setting such as work, others do not. The cognitive
failures documented in the laboratory may disappear when people are
17. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 47 (1988). One notable manifestation of the status quo bias is the
endowment effect, which is the tendency of people to value a good more when they possess it as
opposed to when they do not. For a review of the literature on the endowment effect, see
Elizabeth Hoffijan & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal
and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59(1993).
18. See Ernst Fehr et al., Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental
Investigation, 108 Q.J. ECON. 437, 438 (1993) (examining the impact of fairness on market
prices).
19. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kabneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991).
20. See MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISIONMAKING 37-39 (3d ed.
1994); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 46-50 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
21. One of the oft-repeated findings in the behavioral economics literature is that there
are some people who do not suffer from over-optimism-the clinically depressed. See SHELLEY
E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE HEALTHY MIND 212-15
(1989). Also, in running experiments like the prisoner's dilemma, economic students are more
likely to act rationally and defect than are students who have not majored in economics. See
John R. Carter & Michael D. Irons, Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1991, at 171, 177 (researching how economics students behave differently);
Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1993, at 159, 163-67 (studying economics students and the prisoner's dilemma).
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placed in organizational settings.22 Furthermore, the tendencies iden-
tified in the behavioral literature exist in varying degrees across the
population. There is thus no easy translation between findings in the
decision-making literature and prescriptions for law. When applying
the findings of behavioral economics to law, it is necessary to examine
the context in which the law in question operates.
The actors that bankruptcy theory focuses on are faced with
real-world constraints. Creditors are generally not individuals.
Rather, they are institutions such as banks and suppliers that have to
compete in the marketplace in order to survive. To be sure, these
institutions are themselves comprised of individuals, and these indi-
viduals undoubtedly possess the same traits identified by those who
study decision making. Yet the structure of the institution in which
these individuals operate may be such as to counteract at least some
of the biases that would otherwise affect their own individual decision
making. Indeed, some have suggested that one function of or-
ganizations is to "repair" cognitive defects through organizational
practices.m But while an institution may dampen some individual
biases, it may exacerbate others. Put differently, some biases may be
adaptive mechanisms that actually aid the operation of the firm.2
It is easy to articulate why there might be institutional con-
straints that reduce the impact of behavioral biases in the trans-
actions that are the subject of bankruptcy scholarship. Firms ulti-
mately have to compete in the market, and firms that continually
make inefficient choices will not stay in business.25 The imperative of
competition gives firms an incentive to develop internal structures
which may be effective at reducing or even eliminating at least some
22. For example, see J.R. Anderson, Is Human Cognition Adaptive?, 14 BEHAV. & BRAIN
SOI. 471 (1991); Gerd Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to
Kahneman and Tversky, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 592, 594-95 (1996); Norbert Schwarz, Judgement in
a Social Context: Biases, Shortcomings, and the Logic of Conversation, in 26 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123, 124 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1994).
23. See Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can
Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, in 20 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1
(1998).
24. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 101, 108 (1997) ("My most provocative hypothesis is that corporate cultural biases,
particularly optimistic ones, can be adaptive mechanisms for encouraging trust and cooperation,
and for deflecting the selfishness-inducing last-period problem that arises in times of stress and
threat.").
25. It may well be the case that firms that file for bankruptcy under current law are those
firms that have not been able to deal successfully with the tendencies identified by behavioral
economics. Part of the project of integrating behavioral economics into the economic analysis of
bankruptcy law should be to reconsider the operation of current bankruptcy law as a means for
disposing of firms that fail to "repair" cognitive defects.
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of the types of biases in decision making discovered by behavioral
economics. The firms that develop the better internal practices may
well be the firms that have a better chance of surviving in the market.
Indeed, some law and economic scholars have been cautious about
embracing behavioral economics precisely because of the possibility
that either the market or another institution such as a firm may
provide mechanisms to counteract the deviations from pure ration-
ality detected in controlled laboratory experiments. 26
Until recently, little could be said about whether firms re-
sponding to market constraints do in fact find ways to "debias" their
employees. There was little research exploring how firms actually
make decisions. The firm itself was a "black box." Researchers,
however, have begun to look inside the firm. There is a growing
literature which examines how people function in organizational
settings. As with behavioral economics, this is a broad and
interesting literature which cannot be summarized completely in a
sentence or two.27 The promise of this literature is that it has the
potential for ascertaining which, if any, of the findings from behav-
ioral economics carry over into behavior within firms. Some biases
may be filtered out; others may survive; still others may be exacer-
bated. For example, one of the interesting findings of this literature
is that optimism tends to thrive in institutional settings. Those who
successfully move up the corporate hierarchy tend to be the more
optimistic.28 Indeed, the promotion process in many firms actually
overweighs optimism as a positive factor when making decisions. A
related finding is that individuals in firms have an inflated sense of
their ability to control situations. They are willing to attribute good
outcomes to their superior decision-making capacities. This optimism
and illusion of control can contribute to another phenomenon that
researchers have observed: firms, like individuals, often have a ten-
dency to stay with prior commitments despite information that calls
the wisdom of the commitment into question.29 Indeed, individuals in
a hierarchical setting will often seek out information which bolsters
26. See Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and
Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 324-27 (1986) (stating that firm
reputation may mitigate end-period problems); see also Matthew Rabin, Psychology and
Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 31 (1998) ("The conjecture that experience helps
overcome biases often leads economists to doubt the relevance of laboratory evidence from
inexperienced subjects.").
27. For an introduction to this literature, see Langevoort, supra note 24.
28. See id. at 139-43 (discussing the egocentric bias in decision making).
29. For reviews of this literature, see id. at 142-43; Rabin, supra note 26, at 26-29.
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the choices they previously made and avoid information which would
suggest that things are not going as well as planned.
To integrate the scholarship on decision making-both in the
individual and the organizational contexts-into the normative
discussion over bankruptcy policy requires applying these insights to
the three situations in which the economic analysis of bankruptcy law
relies on the rational actor model: rational pricing by creditors, ra-
tional decisions by shareholders, and rational action by managers.
Here, I want to begin this re-examination by taking a tentative look
at the assumption that the costs of an inefficient bankruptcy term are
priced in the credit market. Much of the economic analysis of bank-
ruptcy law rests on this assumption.
In looking at the question of whether lenders price bankruptcy
law, I want to focus on the behavior of financial intermediaries, rather
than on all who supply credit to a firm. It may well be the case that if
the law allowed debtors to select the operative bankruptcy rules,
small creditors would not adjust their lending rates based on the
choice that the debtor made.30 The potential failure to adjust by small
creditors would not eliminate the benefits that accrue from having the
debtor choose the governing bankruptcy rules. To the extent that
debtors select more efficient rules than the government provides, this
may lower the interest rate that small creditors charge all of their
debtors. Also, even if small creditors do not change their behavior at
all, debtors would still benefit from rate adjustments by large
creditors. The reason for this focus is that financial intermediaries
play a dominant role in firm financing. Many firms depend on a
single financing creditor.31 This creditor may be a bank, a finance
company, an insurance company or other source of credit.
If any creditors accurately price bankruptcy terms, one would
expect it to be such institutional lenders. The standard argument for
the efficiency of loan pricing in these markets runs as follows: These
creditors have market incentives to accurately price their loans.
30. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 10, at 885-87 (arguing that small creditors do not
adjust their interest rates based on their priority status); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts
and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1279, 1299-1300 (1997) (same); Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. RFV. 1887, 1928 n.159 (1994) (noting how large
companies will switch from negative covenants to secured financing when at risk); Ronald J.
Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien
Priority, 75 TEx. L. REV. 11, 31-37 (1996) (stating that small contractors respond less to risk
than do banks).
31. See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending
Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 10 (1994) (stating that firms
tend to concentrate their borrowing from one source).
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Those that charge too high an interest rate lose business to financiers
that offer more attractive terms; those that charge too low an interest
rate (which includes making improvident loans) lose money. Given
that the measure of success in lending money is simply getting the
best rate of return, it is easy to separate out the winners and the
losers. 2 Market discipline, the argument goes, requires financial
intermediaries to price loans accurately.83
One can easily confirm that these lenders price at least some
legal rules. A bond with an event risk covenant, which protects the
bondholder against a leveraged acquisition or similar event, costs
more than similar bonds without such protection.34  Lenders also
clearly worry about (and price accordingly) their legal treatment
following financial distress. Secured creditors, who are promised
specific collateral if their debtor defaults, charge lower interest rates
and do in fact receive higher payouts than unsecured creditors if the
firm ends up in bankruptcy.35 These pricing differences suggest that,
32. Bankruptcy law plays little role in disposing of financial intermediaries who encounter
financial distress. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance
Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEx. L. REV. 723, 764 (1998).
33. This argument seems to conflict with the extensive interest that banks have recently
shown towards the reform of the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of individual debtors. The credit
industry has undertaken an extensive campaign to amend the Code to make it harder to
discharge credit card debts through a Chapter 7 liquidation. If banks only receive a competitive
rate of return, why are they spending significant resources trying to affect how their loans are
treated in bankruptcy? The answer may be that they seek a one-time windfall: They would
recover more from existing loans under their proposed legislation than they expected when they
first priced the loan.
34. See Leland Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders and 'Super
Poison Put" Bond Covenants, 46 J. FIN. 689, 702 (1991) (noting that the value of event risk
covenants ranged from 23 to 54 basis points). For an analysis of these covenants, see Marcel
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or
Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1993).
35. Chapter 11 promises secured creditors the present value of their collateral. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994). Unsecured creditors rarely are paid in full on their claims. See Allan
C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in
Bankruptcy, 45 J. FIN. 1457, 1458 (1990) (examining cases in which shareholders received
payment in violation of the absolute priority rule); Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An
Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 749 (1989) (analyzing a
sample of bankruptcies to determine the extent of deviation from the absolute priority rule);
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 141-42 (1990)
(providing a table of percentages paid on various unsecured claims); Lawrence A. Weiss,
Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285,
292, 299 (1990). In most Chapter 7 cases, general creditors do not receive any distribution. See
Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INVL REV. L. & ECON. 223, 226
(1991) (stating that the purpose is not to give creditors assets but to assure them that there are
no assets available); Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve Out Apply Only in
Bankruptcy? A Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1483, 1494-95 n.70 (1997)




to some extent, a lender's pricing is rational in that it takes at least
some legal rules into account.
At the same time, the fact that lenders price some legal rules
does not prove that they price all legal rules. In Barnhill v. Johnson,
the Supreme Court resolved a split among the courts of appeals and
held that, when determining whether a payment to a lender is made
within the ninety-day preference period preceding the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition, the lender is deemed to have received the payment
when the check given to the lender is honored by the debtor's bank.3 6
This holding is adverse to lenders in that it subjects more transfers to
preference attack than would the competing rule, which would have
held that the transfer is made when the lender receives the check.
There is no doubt that the rule the Court adopted will lower the
return to a few lenders on a few loans. It strikes me as fanciful to
maintain, however, that the Court's ruling affected the price of credit.
Indeed, empirical analysis of lending markets has failed to find
statistically significant differences based on differences in mortgage
protection laws37 and on the denial of self-help in automobile
repossessions.3
While perfect lending markets are a familiar assumption in the
economic literature, the extent to which the lending markets
accurately price a loan is an empirical question. Many have
expressed doubts about the strong assumption found in the economic
literature, 9 but it is safe to say that this is a question to which we do
not have a definite empirical answer.4° I have no data to offer on this
debate. What I am interested in is whether the organizational biases
which researchers have uncovered suggest any reason to think that
the credit market does or does not reflect the costs of the governing
bankruptcy regime.
36. 503 U.S. 393, 393 (1992).
37. See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L.
REv. 489, 500-15 (1991) (conducting an empirical examination of the cost of mortgagor
protection laws).
38. See William C. Whitford & Harold Laufer, The Impact of Denying Self-Help
Repossession of Automobiles: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 1975 WIS. L. REV.
607, 654-57 (stating that the impact of the Act is unclear).
39. See LoPucki, supra note 30, at 1920 (stating that the assumption is not generally true
for unsecured markets); Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt,
96 MCH. L. REv. 159, 240-41 (1997) (stating that because of the relative infrequency of
bankruptcy and liquidation, lenders' willingness to issue new debt is not affected).
40. See Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full
Priority Debates, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 1373, 1395 (1997) (suggesting that until all the empirical
evidence is in, the reach of commercial lenders should not be extended).
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In answering this question, we have to first determine the
extent to which the biases that generally exist in organizations flour-
ish in lenders. It is far from certain that the findings from the organ-
izational literature can be translated directly to financial institu-
tions.41  Financial intermediaries sell a different
product-money-than do other firms. There is no a priori reason to
suspect that financial intermediaries lending money necessarily suffer
from the same decision-making biases as product manufacturers.
Whereas the typical entrepreneur hopes to discover the next MS-DOS,
financial intermediaries cannot expect to develop a new product
which will generate exorbitant profits. Rather, they tend to make
investments that have a capped upper limit on the potential return
they will receive.42 This is certainly the case for the standard loan
made by a bank, which is the transaction that funds most firms.
Given these differing markets, it is reasonable to inquire as to
whether financial firms differ from product firms in their organiza-
tional culture. Indeed, there is some evidence that bankers view
transactions differently than those in charge of other firms. For
example, one interesting study shows that entrepreneurs and bankers
perceive and manage business risks differently. 4 3 Entrepreneurs tend
to accept risk as a given and focus on strategies that maximize re-
turns. Bankers, in contrast, begin by identifying the return they seek,
and then attempt to secure that return with as little risk as possible.
Of the findings in the organizational literature, perhaps the
most threatening to the long-term health of a financial institution
would be excessive optimism." The primary transaction for lenders is
41. It is also the case that financial institutions may differ among themselves. See Mann,
supra note 39, at 217 (noting that bankers told him about differing cultures in loan depart-
ments). Along these lines, it is interesting to note that the empirical literature finds wide
variation in bank efficiency, much of which remains unexplained. See Allen N. Berger &
Loretta J. Mester, Inside the Black Box: What Explains Differences in the Efficiencies of
Financial Institutions?, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 895, 943-45 (1997) (examining the sources of the
differences in the efficiency of financial institutions). It would be an interesting research project
to ascertain whether the observed differences in bank efficiencies are correlated with differ-
ences in bank culture.
42. To be sure, financial institutions are always trying to develop new financial products.
The recent expansion of derivatives is an example of such a product. While these products may
bring large returns for the financial institutions that develop them, the possibility of such
returns does not affect the lender's decision on which this Essay focuses.
43. See D.K. Sarasvathy et al., Perceiving and Managing Business Risks: Differences
Between Entrepreneurs and Bankers, 33 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 207 (1998).
44. For a study showing that organizational factors tend to dominate cognitive factors
when bankers assess risk, see Gary McNamara & Philip Bromiley, Decision Making in an
Organizational Setting: Cognitive and Organizational Influences on Risk Assessment in
Commercial Lending, 40 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 1063 (1997).
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lending money. This transaction tends to cap the lender's possible
upside gain. The most that the lender can hope for in a lending
transaction is the repayment of principal and the contractual rate of
interest. Taking an unjustified risk on a loan cannot result in an
extremely large return to the bank. To the extent that excessive
optimism could lead to such loans, one would expect banks to have
developed mechanisms to combat such tendencies.
One would not, however, expect banks to combat the bias to-
ward optimism by attempting to hire the overly pessimistic. Banks
only make money by making loans, and a naysayer is going to be at a
disadvantage compared to someone who is able to close transactions.
Moreover, to the extent that a bank is overly pessimistic, it runs the
risk of not making any loans. Few banks eschew safe loans; one
would imagine that the overly pessimistic bank would not only avoid
"risky" loans, but may either charge higher interest rates on loans
that it was willing to make or add additional constraints in the
lending documents that would be objectionable to borrowers. In
making loans, a little optimism may actually put a bank at a competi-
tive advantage.45 It is thus no surprise that one researcher reported
having a banking officer tell him that it is the responsibility of loan
officers to "get money out the door."46
Were excessive optimism pervasive in lenders, this might lead
to the conclusion that bankruptcy reforms would not affect lending
practices. If no one believes that this debtor to whom you are lending
will go bankrupt, why worry about bankruptcy law? Yet given that
firms do fail, unchecked optimism would endanger the long-term
financial health of the lender. Given this risk, it is not surprising
that many banks have internal structures which guard against such
optimism. For example, one major recent development in the small
business lending context-credit scoring-is designed to decrease the
discretion of the lending officer.47 Credit scoring takes a small
number of objective facts, feeds them into a program, and comes up
with a result-reject the application, make the loan, or, in some cases,
leave the matter to the discretion of the lending officer. The program
is based on a statistical comparison with past loans, and is updated as
more information about past loans becomes available.
45. See Heath et al., supra note 23, at 19 (reporting that lender increased loan approval by
asking loan officers to consider whether loan application should be approved rather than asking
whether it should be denied).
46. Mann, supra note 39, at 242.
47. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1, 30-34 (1997) (providing an in-depth discussion of credit scoring).
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Credit scoring reduces the potential for improvident lending in
two ways. Most obviously, it reduces the discretion of the lending
officer. Many applications are rejected by the system and thus cannot
be granted by even the most optimistic loan officer. Credit scoring
potentially affects the actions of loan officers in a second, more subtle,
way as well. Credit scoring reduces the amount of time that an officer
invests in examining the loan application. This makes it less likely
that an officer will become invested in the project under
consideration. One finding of behavioral economics is that once a
belief forms, it is difficult to induce the person to change it. 48 This
suggests that once a loan officer invests much of her time in deciding
to grant a loan application, she may ignore later evidence that the
loan is in trouble. By reducing the scrutiny that a loan officer gives a
loan, credit scoring may make it less likely that the officer will form a
belief to which she is wedded.
Credit scoring thus checks the tendency that loan officers may
have toward excessive optimism. It may also provide an indirect
mechanism for pricing bankruptcy regimes. Unfortunately, much of
the information surrounding the actual workings of credit scoring
systems is proprietary. One thing that is known, however, is that the
systems are based on the performance of past loans. All agree that
bankruptcy law affects this performance. To the extent that
bankruptcy law dissipates assets or transfers them away from
creditors, creditors will receive a lower return. Indeed, the credit
industry's recent lobbying efforts for bankruptcy reform legislation on
the consumer side demonstrate a belief on the part of lenders that
bankruptcy law does affect loan performance, at least for consumer
debtors. It is thus conceivable that credit scoring is sensitive to the
effect of the applicable bankruptcy regime. Moreover, to the extent
that choice of a bankruptcy regime would affect future loan
performance, this choice may ultimately be picked up by credit
scoring programs.
The risk of a loan officer becoming too committed to a client's
loan request exists in situations where credit scoring may not be
feasible. To date, credit scoring has been used in individual and
small-business loan areas, but not in the general commercial loan
context. In this context, some large banks have taken other actions
that have the effect of reducing biases in the lending decision. In
these banks, the loan officer who solicits the loan application has no
48. See sources cited supra note 29.
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responsibility for deciding whether or not the loan is made. Rather,
the loan application and the company's financial statements are sent
to another office that decides whether or not to make the loan. The
loan officer exercises no independent judgment on whether or not to
make the loan. Rather, the officer is in the nature of a salesperson.
Her compensation is based on how many products-loans, deposits,
treasury management services-she is able to sell each year. The
office that actually makes the lending decision is evaluated on the
performance of the loans that it makes. This office, however, has
little or no actual relationship with the customer, and is not
responsible for servicing the loan or deciding when the loan is in
danger of not being repaid.
This decoupling of loan application solicitation from the loan
approval process both reduces the risk of bias and provides appropri-
ate economic incentives for those who solicit loans and those who
approve them. The risk of cognitive bias is reduced by ensuring that
the bank officer who makes the lending decision does not have a prior
relationship with the client.49 The compensation structure provides
economic incentives for those who solicit loan applications to be as
aggressive as possible-the more loans "sold," the more compensation
the officer receives. As for the officer who actually approves the loan,
she is evaluated on the performance of the loans that she approves.
The loan officer who solicits loans has the incentive to procure as
many loan applications as possible, whereas the officer who approves
the loan has the incentive to only approve loans that she expects to be
profitable. Here, as is often the case, behavioral economic analysis
and traditional economic analysis offer compatible explanations for
the same practice. 50
A second common feature in financial institutions which may
negate the bias to remain committed to a course of action is the divi-
sion between the bank employee who is responsible for originating
and servicing the loan and the bank employee who is responsible for
handling the loan once the borrower encounters financial distress.
Most banks transfer a loan from the operating division to a workout
division once the loan becomes distressed.51 One obvious effect of this
49. The loan approval officer may of course face other risks of bias. See McNamara &
Bromiley, supra note 44, at 1079-80 (reporting that loan officers are more likely to approve
loans for an "exciting" industry).
50. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997) (telling compatible
economic and psychological stories as to why transactional lawyers overstate legal risks).




transfer is that it removes responsibility for the loan from the person
who made the original decision to solicit the loan and transfers that
responsibility to a person who has not made any prior judgment on
the merits of the project. This transfer counteracts any bias that the
lending officer may have in favor of continuation. One option always
open to a lender is simply to keep monitoring the loan but let the
debtor attempt to turn the project around. If in fact people in
organizational settings are hesitant to question prior commitments
that they have made, this tendency would suggest that loan origina-
tors would have a continuation bias. Thus, one would expect that
loan officers who made the original loan would be more likely to opt
for continuation than an objective assessment of the facts would sug-
gest. By transferring the loan to a new person, such bias may be
counteracted.52
Moreover, the structure of relations between the originating
division and the workout division suggests an attempt at debiasing.
Most institutions transfer a loan to a "special assets" division once the
loan is identified as a problem loan.5s The decision to transfer can be
based either on objective or subjective factors. It reflects poorly on
loan officers if they delay in transferring a problem loan to the special
assets division.M The knowledge of such possible negative
imprecation may temper undue optimism on the part of the lending
officer when making the loan in the first instance.
The price at which the loan is transferred to the special assets
division may lead to debiasing of both the lending division and the
special assets division. As to the lending division, when the loan is
transferred to the special assets division, the lender values its ex-
pected recovery on the loan at that time. To the extent that the
expected recovery is less than 100 percent, this loss is assigned to the
originating division. In other words, officers who initially approve a
loan know that their performance on loans are judged not on the ulti-
mate outcome, but on how things stand when they transfer the loan.
By quantifying the loss at the time of transfer, the bank may be using
the phenomenon of loss aversion to counteract the potential commit-
ment bias. The loan officer knows that, to the extent losses increase,
she will be held responsible. Behavioral economics has shown that
52. In banks where lending officers both solicit and approve loan applications, the
continuation bias would be even stronger than it is in banks that have segregated the
solicitation and approval functions.
53. See Mann, supra note 39, at 187-90 (describing a bank's process for selecting debtors
for termination).
54. See id. at 187.
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people attach higher values to avoiding a loss than they do to
procuring a gain of the same magnitude. To the extent that the loan
officer knows that inaction on her part may increase the loss, she may
be more willing to transfer the asset than she otherwise would be.
The special assets division to which the loan is transferred gets
the loan at the price set at the time of transfer. To the extent that it
ultimately recovers more than the expected amount, it is credited
with the profit; to the extent that it recovers less, it is charged with
the loss. Thus, the special assets division has the correct economic
incentives to make the efficient decision as to how to proceed with the
loan (at least from the bank's perspective). Moreover, since this is the
first contact that the special assets division employee has with the
loan, there is no a priori reason to believe that the officers in this
division have any decisional bias toward either continuation or
termination of the loan.
Of course, the fact that the special assets division has the
appropriate incentive to take the action which maximizes the lender's
recovery does not mean that the division will maximize the value of
the debtor firm. Much depends on the relationship between the
amount owed on the loan and the value of the debtor firm. If the
bank's loan has priority over other loans, and if there is little chance
that under any scenario the debtor will repay the loan in full, then the
bank will have the incentive to maximize firm value. In the situation
just described, the lender receives all of the benefits of the correct
allocation of the firm's assets as well as all of the costs of an incorrect
allocation. In other words, the lender is the marginal claimant.
In other situations, there may be an incentive on the part of
the bank to terminate the loan even if this does not maximize the
value of the firm. First, there is the economic incentive. Termination
may limit the bank's losses to where they stand at the present time.
If the loan is continued, the bank may bear all of the potential future
losses if the value of the firm decreases further, but may not reap all
of the gains if the firm's value increases. Since the lender's claim is
capped by its contract, such gains may go either to other creditors of
the firm or to the shareholders. Second, there may be a cultural bias
in the special assets division towards termination. Ronald Mann re-
ports that often when a loan is transferred to the special assets
division, it is refinanced by a loan from another institution. The
behavior of this second institution seems odd; why would a bank that
knows nothing about the firm lend money when the lender that
presumably has better information is terminating its relationship
with the firm? Mann argues that different lenders have different
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tolerances for risk.55 Thus, to the extent that a loan is, almost by
definition, too risky for the lender by the time it has gotten to special
assets, those in special assets may have a bias toward terminating the
relationship. If a firm is not able to get new financing, this may lead
to a liquidation of the firm.
The transfer of the loan from the operating division to the
special assets division suggests a mechanism by which bankruptcy
law may be priced inside the lender. One of the arguments as to why
bankruptcy law may not be priced in credit terms is that the potential
bankruptcy of a borrower is too remote and too unlikely an event.56 At
the time the loan is transferred inside the bank to the distressed loan
department, however, the lender knows that bankruptcy is a definite
possibility.57 As an internal matter, the cost of bankruptcy is visible
to the lender. To the extent that the loss for the loan is assigned to
the lending division, that part of the loss attributable to bankruptcy
law is priced to that division. The lending division has to cover these
costs through its operations. If in fact current bankruptcy law is
inefficient and these costs are borne by the lending division, then
these costs may lead the lending division to alter its lending practices.
Thus, while behavioral economics suggests that loan officers may not
be cognizant of bankruptcy law when they make their loans, the in-
ternal pricing in the lenders may force these costs to be recouped.
Crucial to this analysis, of course, is the magnitude of the costs of
bankruptcy law. This is an empirical question on which we have little
data.58
Note that the internal structure of banks would make it rela-
tively easy for lenders to price various bankruptcy regimes were we to
move to a system that allowed firms to commit to differing sets of
insolvency rules. To the extent that a bankruptcy regime based on
private choice would generate differing bankruptcy rules, lenders may
ultimately get information about the effects of these different rules
through this internal pricing mechanism. If these differences turn
out to be significant, it may be the case that these differentials would
ultimately be reflected in the actions of the originators.
55. See Mann, supra note 39, at 215-19.
56. See id. at 240-41 (stating that the infrequency of bankruptcy does not lead to
significant effects on the issuance of new debt).
57. In Mann's study of distressed secured loans, approximately 10 percent of those loans
ended up in bankruptcy. See id. at 240. This may understate the number of distressed loans
that end up in bankruptcy, however, given that some of these loans were refinanced, and these
new loans may end up in bankruptcy.
58. See Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J.
437, 476 (1992) (noting the lack of evidence about the direct costs of the Chapter 11 system).
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The above argument posits that, despite biases in decision
making, the costs of inefficient bankruptcy laws are passed on to
debtors. The literature on behavioral economics suggests a different,
more interesting, hypothesis: shifting to a contract regime may in-
crease the efficiency of the lending market. It is easy to articulate a
theory that lenders under the current regime often fail to price bank-
ruptcy rules accurately. It is probably true that most lenders fail to
focus on bankruptcy rules when they make loans. Most loans are re-
paid without encountering financial distress.59 Of those loans that do
become distressed, only a small portion of these end up in bank-
ruptcy.60 If bankruptcy costs are relatively small-again, an issue
about which we do not have good information-they may not have an
impact on the market for credit. Moreover, firms cannot legally bind
themselves at the time they borrow money not to file for bankruptcy.
If in fact bankers focus on minimizing risks when they make loans,
they may not focus on the costs of bankruptcy because a bankruptcy
filing will be an option available to the debtor regardless of the terms
of the contract.
Yet it may be the case that moving to a regime of free contract-
ing over bankruptcy would result in lenders pricing differing bank-
ruptcy rules. Recall the study that finds that bankers tend to view
the problem as minimizing risk rather than maximizing return. To
the extent that this finding is robust, it suggests that banks would be
cognizant of differences in bankruptcy terms when making lending
decisions. As noted above, bankruptcy law currently is a mandatory
rule which neither the lenders nor the debtors can alter at the time of
contracting. Given this, it would not be surprising if lenders
currently did not pay much attention to bankruptcy law. For this
reason, I do not find it surprising that when bankers who make loans
were asked whether reserving twenty percent of the value of
collateral for unsecured creditors would reduce the availability of
secured credit, they said it would not.61 Even with this significant
change in the law, it still may be the case that those making the loans
59. See Mann, supra note 39, at 239 n.327 (estimating that "well over 95% of loans will be
repaid as agreed without incident").
60. See id. at 240 (stating that of 72 distressed loans studied, only seven ended up in
bankruptcy).
61. See id. at 241-43 (reflecting the view that loan origination officers do not consider
bankruptcy scenarios). For similar reasons, I am not surprised by Steve Schwarcz's report that
bankruptcy attorneys believe that this proposal would have a deleterious effect on lending
practices. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 47 DuKE L.J. 425, 427 (1997). Attorneys have a variety of reasons for exaggerating
the risks posed by legal rules. See generally Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 50.
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would not consider the effect of bankruptcy law in their decision-
making process, because they have no control over this aspect of the
loan.
This inattention to bankruptcy law in the origination market
may change if the proposals to switch bankruptcy law to the realm of
contract are adopted. Then bankers could have a say in which legal
avenues would be available if the debtor firm were to encounter
financial distress. Whereas Chapter 11 is an immutable feature of
the landscape to those making loans, a bankruptcy regime built on
debtor choice may make the governing bankruptcy rules a salient
feature when loan officers decide to make loans.
At a general level, the basic choice among possible bankruptcy
regimes is between court-supervised reorganization and the sale of
the firm, either piecemeal or as a whole. The sale option presents less
risk to the bank than does the reorganization option. As things stand
in current practice, it is usually the case that most reorganization
attempts end up as sales anyway, after funds have been spent on the
reorganization effort.6 2 Even in successful reorganization, lenders
routinely see violations of contractual priority.63 Finally, even if the
lender believes that it can receive a higher return through a restruc-
turing of the firm, it may be in a position to orchestrate such a re-
structuring outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, many reorganizations take
place outside of bankruptcy.6 To the extent that lenders are con-
cerned about lowering risks, they may have a preference for sales over
reorganization. In other words, lenders may offer lower interest rates
or larger loans to debtors who commit to not filing for a court-super-
vised reorganization.
Such increased attention to the costs of bankruptcy rules
would be in line with the general trend that appears to be emerging in
the banking industry today. With the growing emphasis on national
and regional banks, there is an increasing specialization in bank func-
tions. Each employee now has fewer tasks to perform, and is evalu-
ated on her performance of those tasks. To the extent that an em-
62. See James W. Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for
Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 955, 963-64 (1994) (discussing the
small percentage of successful reorganizations); Robert K Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter
11, 8 BANMR. DV. L.J. 319, 322 (1991) (stating that in most reorganization bankruptcies, credi-
tors would have received more if the debtor would have originally filed for Chapter 7 liquida-
tion).
63. See sources cited supra note 35.
64. See Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & ECON. 595,
595-96 n.1 (1993) (summarizing studies that suggest that approximately 45.5% of firms in
financial distress restructure without entering bankruptcy).
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ployee's task is influenced by the effect of bankruptcy law, one would
expect that the market for credit will be more likely to price the cost
of such laws.
As with much of behavioral economics, it is still too early to
draw definite conclusions. However, to the extent that normative
bankruptcy scholarship turns on the assumption that lenders would
take account of bankruptcy terms when making loans, it may be that
behavioral economics, far from invalidating this hypothesis, may give
it added credence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Behavioral economics calls into question some of the basic
assumptions of the rational actor model. But it does not replace it
with an irrational actor model in which people make choices in a
random fashion. What is needed is a careful reexamination of argu-
ments premised on the rational actor model to ascertain the extent to
which behavioral economics suggests modifications. The economic
analysis of bankruptcy law invokes the rational-actor assumption at
many turns. Thus, it is a prime candidate for the insights that behav-
ioral economics has to offer, both to the extent that it analyzes the
effects of extant law and to the extent that it proposes sweeping
changes in that law.
As to the normative branch of bankruptcy scholarship, one of
the crucial assumptions on which it rests is that creditors would price
the effect of differing bankruptcy regimes. At first blush, behavioral
economics suggests reasons why this assumption may not be true.
Lenders may suffer from excessive optimism and not worry about
bankruptcy; they may not price the effects of bankruptcy law because,
at the time of the initial transaction, bankruptcy is too remote an
event; and they may be too committed to the lending decision to act
promptly when the debtor becomes financially distressed. Yet the
internal mechanisms of banks may provide effective guards against
these biases. Moreover, by making the governing bankruptcy
procedures a choice rather than a mandatory regime, it may well be
the case that this would create even greater attention on the part of
lenders to the effect of bankruptcy rules. Thus, the assumption that
bankruptcy law affects the price and supply of credit seems to remain
a reasonable possibility. Yet it may well be the case that other
assumptions in the economic analysis of bankruptcy law may have to
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be altered in light of our new understanding of the ways in which
people make decisions.

